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Imagine a world in which you can control nearly everything with a
voice command or the tap of a thumb. “Alexa, start my car.” “Siri, turn on
my lights for the evening.” The rate at which we are developing new technol-
ogy far surpasses the rate at which we are adapting the law to match. In 1986,
less than half of one percent of Americans owned cellular phones.1 In 1994,
only nine percent of Americans owned cellular phones.2 As of 2016, ninety-
five percent of Americans owned cellular phones.3 Ownership of smart de-
vices is also on the rise.4 According to research, one in six adults in the
United States, around thirty-nine million Americans, owns a voice-activated
smart device.5 “Additionally, thirty-one percent of smart speaker owners are
asking their virtual assistants to control other devices in the home, with sixty-
one percent controlling devices in the living room and thirty-eight percent
controlling devices in the kitchen.”6 The more technology advances, the more
difficult it becomes to protect privacy with existing judicial standards and
antiquated statutes.
Under current judicial interpretations, because we are sharing informa-
tion with third parties, such as Amazon through the Echo device, the data
shared is not granted Fourth Amendment protection.7 This is due to the con-
tinued use of the third-party doctrine, which essentially eliminates any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy for information that is voluntarily conveyed to
* Brandon Pieratt is a 2019 candidate for a Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman
School of Law. He received a Bachelor of Business Administration from Mid-
western State University in Wichita Falls, Texas.
1. See CTIA, BACKGROUND ON CTIA’S WIRELESS INDUS. SURVEY 2 (2015),
https://api.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ctia_survey_
ye_2014_graphics.pdf.
2. See id. at 2.
3. See Mobile Facts Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet
.org/fact-sheet/mobile/.
4. See Ryan Browne, Adoption of Voice-Activated Speakers is Now Outpacing





7. See generally United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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a third party.8 This doctrine has been used to allow the warrantless collection
of many types of information, including cell phone location data and bank
records.9 More recently, a court in Oregon attempted to obtain recorded data
from an Amazon Echo device that was located in the home of a murder
suspect.10 Unfortunately for progress, the issue was never litigated because
the defendant agreed to turn over the data voluntarily, so we can only specu-
late on where the law is headed in this area.11
This Comment argues that the current Fourth Amendment protections
afforded to data voluntarily conveyed to third parties is inadequate for an age
in which nearly all of our information is shared with an outside agent. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court must update the doctrine or get rid of it com-
pletely. The Court may do this by applying the Katz test to each factual
situation rather than simply determining that if the information was provided
to a third party, it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. In addition, the
Court must reexamine its definition of “voluntary” and further analyze the
totality of the circumstances when coming to its conclusions.
Part II of this comment discusses the history of the law as applied to
advances in technology. Part III discusses the most current applications of
the law. Next, Part IV will give a brief overview of virtual assistants and
their relevance. Part V will discuss the proposed solution to the current mis-
application of third-party doctrine precedent, and Part VI will discuss the
possible problems with the proposed solutions. The Comment will conclude
by applying the proposed solution to a hypothetical scenario involving the
technologies discussed.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE
LAW SURROUNDING THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.12
8. See id.
9. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016); see also
Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
10. See Haley Edwards, Alexa Takes the Stand: Listening Devices Raise Privacy
Issues, TIME (May 4, 2017), http://time.com/4766611/alexa-takes-the-stand-lis-
tening-devices-raise-privacy-issues/.
11. See id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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According to the Supreme Court, “the central meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment is ‘reasonableness.’”13 “Whether a particular search or seizure is rea-
sonable is generally determined by balancing the competing interests at
stake—the government’s interest in effective law enforcement versus an in-
dividual’s interest in privacy and personal security.”14 Additionally, several
narrowly-defined exceptions to the warrant requirement have been delineated
through case law.15 A warrantless search by police is invalid unless it falls
within one of these exceptions.16 Exceptions to the warrant requirement in-
clude searches and seizures incident to a lawful arrest, those yielding contra-
band in plain view, those in hot pursuit of a fleeing criminal, those limited to
a stop-and-frisk based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, those
based on probable cause in the presence of exigent circumstances, and those
based on consent.17
The third-party doctrine, under which “an individual can claim ‘no legit-
imate expectation of privacy’ in information that he has voluntarily turned
over to a third party,”18 is a controversial exception that is often criticized but
highly influential.19 The exception has been applied to bank records,20 credit
card statements,21 employment records,22 and cell-site location data,23 among
others.24 The following line of cases mark pivotal moments in the evolution
of this controversial exception.
B. Katz v. United States
Katz v. United States marks the beginning of the third-party doctrine.25
In Katz, the Court held that the wiretapping of a public phone booth consti-
tuted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and therefore re-
13. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197, 198 (1993).
14. Id. at 199.
15. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 114 (2018).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016).
19. John P. Collins, The Third Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, JUST. ACTION
CTR. (2012), http://www.nyls.edu/documents/justice-action-center/student_cap
stone_journal/cap12collins.pdf [http://perma.cc/CXA7-HLFN].
20. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976).
21. United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993).
22. United States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979–80 (D. Or. 2006).
23. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 359–61 (5th Cir. 2014).
24. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also United States v. For-
rester, 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2008).
25. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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quired a warrant.26 This holding is significant because it marks the first time
that the Supreme Court did not require a physical intrusion to constitute a
search.27 The Court rejected the government’s argument that the actions of its
agents “should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements” because
there was no physical penetration of the phone booth and instead held that
the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”28 The Court further
held that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”29 Finally, the Court expresses that the reach of
the Fourth Amendment is affected, at least in part, by a citizen’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.30
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan develops a two-part test that
would later be judicially recognized as a staple of Fourth Amendment analy-
sis.31 The Katz test requires “first that a person have exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” (objective).32 Harlan em-
phasizes a personal aspect of privacy and infers that the conduct of an indi-
vidual can provide the court with evidence of a person’s subjective
expectation.33 For instance, in the Katz case, Harlan opines that the expecta-
tion of privacy can be found in the fact that one who occupies a phone booth
“shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call”
(objective conduct of an individual).34 “The point is not that the booth is
‘accessible to the public’ at other times, but that it is a temporarily private
place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion
are recognized as reasonable” (subjective expectations).35 Katz v. United
States shifted Fourth Amendment analysis away from the property-based ap-
proach that generally linked privacy protections to the home.36 The shift to
focusing on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy opened the door for
another exception to the warrant requirement: the third-party doctrine.
26. See id. at 359.
27. See id. at 352.
28. Id. at 351–52.
29. Id. at 351.
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).




35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
36. See id. at 352 (majority opinion).
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C. United States v. Miller
Third-party doctrine principals began to emerge shortly after the opinion
in Katz.37 For instance, in Couch v. United States, the Court found that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in documents that
were handed over to an accountant who then provided them to the Internal
Revenue Service.38 A few years later, one of the more notable cases that
applied third party doctrine principles was heard: United States v. Miller.39 In
Miller, the defendant kept bank accounts with several banks who then, with-
out being served a warrant, provided the defendant’s banking information to
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.40 At trial, the defendant was
found guilty of a number of offenses due to the disclosure of the account
information.41 The appellate court reversed, finding that the bank records
should have been suppressed.42 When reviewed by the Supreme Court, the
Court reversed, finding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his bank records because the bank was a third party to which he
voluntarily disclosed his affairs when he opened his accounts at the bank.43
The Court in Miller seems to focus on the voluntariness of the defen-
dant’s actions and the sensitivity of the information conveyed.44 The defen-
dant contended that the records kept by the banks were only made available
for limited purposes in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.45
The Court referred to Katz when justifying their decision, stating that, al-
though the courts have moved away from property interests, a “search and
seizure becomes unreasonable when the Government’s activities violate ‘the
privacy on which a person justifiably relies’” and that “what a person know-
ingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.”46 The Court, up to this point, had repeatedly held that information
revealed to a third party and then conveyed to the government is not prohib-
ited by the Fourth Amendment even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
in the third party will not be betrayed.47
37. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
38. See id.
39. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
40. See id. at 437–38.
41. See id. at 438–39.
42. See id. at 439.
43. See id. at 442.
44. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
45. See id. at 442.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 443.
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Although it seems the Court had already justified their decision, to bol-
ster their opinion even more, the Court further examined “the nature of the
particular documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether
there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”48
The Court found that because the information obtained only contained “in-
formation voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees
in the ordinary course of business,” there was no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the bank records.49 The Court stated that:
[e]ven if we direct our attention to the original checks and deposit
slips, rather than to the microfilm copies actually viewed and ob-
tained by means of the subpoena, we perceive no legitimate ‘ex-
pectation of privacy’ in their contents. The checks are not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions.50
If the information were more sensitive, it is difficult to determine, based on
the opinion, if the Court would have come to a different conclusion. The
sensitivity of the information conveyed continues to be an important part of
the Court’s analysis when applying the Katz test to Fourth Amendment
claims.
D. Smith v. Maryland
The third-party doctrine was strengthened in Smith v. Maryland.51 In
Smith, the police requested that the telephone company install a pen register
at the central office to record the numbers dialed from the defendant’s
phone.52 The police did not get a warrant or a court order before the pen
register was installed.53 The information captured on the pen register led to a
warrant to search the defendant’s home, which led to the arrest and convic-
tion of the defendant.54 The Supreme Court granted review to “to resolve
indications of conflict in the decided cases as to the restrictions imposed by
the Fourth Amendment on the use of pen registers.”55
Consequently, the Court reinforced the reach of the third-party doctrine.
The Court found that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy
because he “voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone
company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary
48. Id. at 442.
49. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
50. Id.
51. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
52. See id. at 737.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 738.
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course of business.”56 Smith argued that because he was not conveying the
information to a person with the ability to remember every number but to a
machine, which only recorded the numbers because of the pen register de-
vice, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy.57 The Court refused to make
the distinction and opined that, because the defendant voluntarily conveyed
the information to the phone company which had the ability to record num-
bers dialed, the defendant “assumed the risk that the information would be
divulged to police.”58 The Court came to its conclusion by applying the Katz
test, highlighting the voluntary nature of the disclosure and the lack of sensi-
tivity of the information obtained.59 “Neither the purport of any communica-
tion between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”60 Justice
Stewart, in the dissent, was not convinced by this argument.61 He believed
that the “content distinction” was arbitrary and that the numbers dialed from
a private telephone are not without content.62 The “content distinction” will
become an important element in third-party doctrine cases in the future.
This line of cases set the stage for the future of Fourth Amendment
analysis in the courts. The current application of the third-party doctrine can
be troublesome in an age where citizens share nearly all of their information
with a third party. Our financial transactions are made through a wire transfer
or with the swipe of a card through an electronic system. We send correspon-
dence through email and text message, search for an abundance of informa-
tion on the internet, and control our music and appliances through voice
activated smart devices. All of these platforms are run by third parties with
whom we “voluntarily” share our information.
E. United States v. Forrester
Around thirty years after Smith, the courts seemed to apply the third-
party doctrine without much of a change. In United States v. Forrester, the
government employed various surveillance techniques without a warrant
which enabled them to learn the “to and from” addresses of the defendant’s
email messages, the IP addresses of the websites the defendant visited, and
the total volume of information sent to or from his account.63 The defendant
claimed the government’s surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment, and
56. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
57. See id. at 745.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 741–42.
60. Id. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977)).
61. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 748.
63. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the court applied the Katz test along with third-party doctrine principles.64
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the methods used were indistin-
guishable from that of the pen register approved in Smith and found no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the information obtained because “[users]
should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service
providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”65
Additionally, the information obtained did not “reveal any more about the
underlying contents of communication than do phone numbers.”66
The Forrester court seemed to focus on the significance of the informa-
tion, a growing theme when courts analyze the third-party doctrine as applied
to emerging technologies.67 The court compared the surveillance of email
addresses to the information the government could observe on the outside of
physical mail.68 This mail analogy has been allowed in cases dating back to
the nineteenth century.69 Judge Fisher stated that devices that obtain address-
ing information and the amount of information sent do not “breach the line
between mere addressing and more content-rich information.”70 The distinc-
tion between content-rich information and metadata has continued to play a
pivotal role in the application of the third-party doctrine.
III. DIALING DOWN THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Although the courts have applied the third-party doctrine consistently,
there has been a recent trend of carving out exceptions in the application of
the doctrine. This is especially true in cases involving current technology that
is becoming more prevalent in the lives of Americans, such as email and
global positioning system (GPS) location data. Additionally, there have been
decisions that are not directly related to the third-party doctrine but have the
potential to influence Fourth Amendment application in the future in a way
that could restore the privacy protections that the Framers intended.
A. United States v. Warshak
In United States v. Warshak, the government obtained approximately
27,000 of the defendant’s emails from internet service providers without a
warrant.71 The defendant claimed the warrantless “search” of his emails was
64. See id. at 509.
65. Id. at 510.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 510–11.
68. Id. at 511.
69. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010).
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a violation of the Fourth Amendment.72 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the Katz test to determine whether there was a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a person’s emails.73
First, the court analyzed the subjective component to determine whether
the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his
emails.74 Because of the “often sensitive and sometimes damning substance
of his emails,” the court found that the defendant did have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.75 The court then analyzed whether “society is prepared
to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”76 The court compared the con-
tent of the defendant’s emails to the content of letters and telephone calls.77
The court also recognized the importance of allowing the evolution of Fourth
Amendment protections to match the “inexorable march of technological
process, or its guarantees will wither and perish.”78 In the end, the court de-
termined that both elements of the Katz test were met, creating a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the defendant’s emails.79
The court in Warshak was not without reservations.80 The Justices ac-
knowledged that a subscriber agreement may be written in a manner that is
enough to waive the reasonable expectation of privacy.81 They noted that the
ability or right of access of the third party was not enough to overcome the
reasonable expectation of privacy, but, if an internet service provider ex-
pressed an intention to “audit, inspect, and monitor its subscribers emails,”
that might be enough to render an expectation of privacy unreasonable.82 The
Justices also recognized that the Miller decision may disagree with their find-
ings but noted Miller was distinguishable because it involved simple business
records rather than “the potentially unlimited variety of confidential commu-
nications” at issue in Warshak.83 Although the Warshak decision was from a
lower court, the opinion offers hope that Fourth Amendment analysis may
evolve with emerging technologies.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 284.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284.
77. See id. at 285–86.
78. Id. at 285.
79. See id. at 286 (releasing the contents of the emails was ultimately allowed
because of the government’s good faith reliance on the Stored Communications
Act).
80. See id. at 286–87.
81. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 287–88.
82. See id. at 287.
83. Id. at 287–88.
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B. United States v. Jones
United States v. Jones is an example of a case that does not directly
involve the application of the third-party doctrine but has the potential to
influence this area of the law.84 In this case, the government installed a GPS
tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle without a warrant and monitored
his movements over the course of four weeks.85 The Supreme Court found
that the government’s use of the GPS device to monitor the defendant’s
movements constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment by applying
traditional property principles in the search and seizure analysis.86 Justice
Scalia believed that the actions of the government clearly constituted a physi-
cal occupation of “private property for the purpose[s] of obtaining informa-
tion.”87 Up until the latter half of the twentieth century, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common law trespass.88 The Court chose to once
again apply these principles to Fourth Amendment analysis in spite of the
growing influence of the Katz decision.89
The Court struck down the government’s contention that the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the location of his vehicle on
public roads or the underbody of the vehicle where the device was attached
because the defendant’s rights “do not rise or fall with the Katz formula-
tion.”90 The majority felt that, at the very least, they should preserve the
degree of privacy against government intrusion “that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”91 They explained that, for most of our history, the
Fourth Amendment has protected us against government intrusion into the
areas enumerated and that the Katz decision did not revoke this protection.92
The revitalization of past protections may mark a shift in the way that courts
analyze Fourth Amendment claims.
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence is particularly important regarding the
third-party doctrine and its application to cases involving emerging technolo-
gies.93 Sotomayor agrees that the physical intrusion is a deciding factor in
this case.94 However, Sotomayor further analyzes the scope of the Fourth
84. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
85. Id. at 403.
86. See id. at 404–05.
87. Id. at 404.
88. Id. at 405.
89. See id. at 406.
90. Jones, 565 U.S. at 406.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 406–07.
93. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
94. See id.
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Amendment and its evolving application.95 Sotomayor particularly conveys
her reservations with the application of the third-party doctrine.96 Her con-
currence states “[t]his approach is ill-suited to the digital age, in which peo-
ple reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”97
The concurrence details a number of tasks that Americans participate in
daily that may implicate the third-party doctrine but in which most people
would not accept the warrantless disclosure of that shared information to the
government without complaint.98 Sotomayor concludes by stating “I would
not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth
Amendment protection.”99 Sotomayor’s concurrence has already been widely
cited and perhaps reflects a changing attitude in the application of the third
party doctrine. This concurrence, coupled with apparently changing attitudes
toward the application of property principles, may be the change needed to
evolve Fourth Amendment analysis as applied to the increasing number of
cases involving emerging technologies.
C. Riley v. California
The court in Riley v. California determined that the “search incident to
arrest” exception does not apply to the digital contents of cell phones.100 Al-
though the case does not directly implicate the third-party doctrine, the lan-
guage in the opinion has the potential to strengthen privacy protections
surrounding technology in the future. The Court’s opinion seems to indicate
that the Court is beginning to “engage in the challenges of the digital age
ahead.”101 Rather than determine whether there was a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the Court analyzed the degree to which the search intruded upon
the defendant’s privacy and the degree to which such intrusion is needed for
95. Id. at 414–18.
96. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 417–18.
99. Id. at 418.
100. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see also Fourth Amendment—
Search and Seizure—Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest—Riley v. Cali-
fornia, 128 HARV. L. REV. 251 (2014) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment—Search
and Seizure].
101. Marc Rotenberg & Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. California, a Unani-
mous Supreme Court Sets Out Fourth Amendment for Digital Age, SCOTUS-
BLOG (June 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposi
um-in-riley-v-california-a-unanimous-supreme-court-sets-out-fourth-amend
ment-for-digital-age/.
302 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXI
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.102 In doing so, the Court
listed the qualitative and quantitative differences between cell phones and
other objects that are not afforded Fourth Amendment protections.103
The unanimous Court noted that the “immense storage capacity” of cell
phones and other “digital containers” allows for the collection of many dis-
tinct types of information, including data on phones traced back to before the
purchase of the device, that are capable of conveying far more than previ-
ously possible.104 They continued by highlighting the sensitivity of the infor-
mation that can be found in these devices.105 “A phone not only contains, in
digital form, many sensitive records previously found in the home, it also
contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any
form.”106 The Court’s analysis of stored data, and the Court’s ultimate deci-
sion, show that the Court is beginning to believe that “files stored in the
cloud are deserving of the same (if not more) protection than physical ‘pa-
pers and effects’” and “that certain types of information are deserving of
special protection.”107
The decision in Riley seems to be the Court’s way of setting the stage
for the battle against the third-party doctrine.108 The comparison of the quali-
tative differences of data stored on certain devices shows a shift from the
Court’s prior distinctions between metadata and content-information.109 The
Court specifically discusses browser history and location information, which,
in the past, have been disputed in cases involving warrantless seizure.110 This
analysis in particular may indicate the Court’s evolving view on the seizure
of “non-content” data.
The conclusion of this opinion is particularly promising for the protec-
tion of information stored in our devices and on the cloud.111
The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such
information in his hand does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our an-
swer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell
102. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478.
103. See id. at 2489.
104. See id.; see also Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 100.
105. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
106. Id. at 2491.
107. See Rotenberg & Butler, supra note 101.
108. See Rotenberg & Butler, supra note 101.
109. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 2495.
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phone seized incident to arrest is accordingly simple—get a
warrant.112
Although the footnotes limit this decision to cases involving searches inci-
dent to arrest, it reflects the attitudes of the Justices concerning the protection
of digital information.113 In the future, we may recognize similar language in
opinions regarding the application of the Fourth Amendment and the third-
party doctrine.
D. United States v. Graham
More recently, in United States v. Graham, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the warrantless procurement of cell-site location informa-
tion (CSLI) recorded by the defendant’s cellular provider was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.114 Although the decision was later reversed en banc,
the decision is still worth discussing when analyzing the evolution of third-
party doctrine application to Fourth Amendment claims.115 In this case, while
investigating a string of robberies, the government obtained CSLI from the
defendant’s cellular provider for a 221-day time period.116 CSLI allows the
government to identify the location around which a cellular device was lo-
cated at a given time by identifying the cell sites from which a cell phone has
sent or received radio signals.117 The court, in its initial decision, found that
the “government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it
obtains and inspects a cell phone user’s historical CSLI for an extended pe-
riod of time.”118
“Considering the multiple privacy interests at stake,” the court recog-
nized that a cell phone user has a reasonable “expectation of privacy in their
long-term CSLI.”119 Additionally, the court rejected the argument that the
carrier’s privacy policy showed there was no expectation of privacy in their
CSLI because the policy stated the carrier “collects information about the
phone’s location—not that it discloses this information” to others.120 The
112. Id.
113. See id. at 2489, n.1 (“Because the United States and California agree that these
cases involve searches incident to arrest, these cases do not implicate the ques-
tion whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information
amounts to a search under other circumstances.”).
114. See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015) (adhered to in part
on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016)).
115. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).
116. See Graham, 796 F.3d at 341.
117. See id. at 343.
118. Id. at 344–45.
119. Id. at 349.
120. Id. at 345.
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court also highlights the fact that most users do not even read, much less
understand, the carrier’s privacy policy.121 Finally, the court specified that the
third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI because users do not voluntarily
convey location information to carriers122 and because CSLI is more sensitive
than noncontent information.123 Notably, Judge Motz dissented in part, con-
cluding that the defendants voluntarily shared their CSLI with third parties
and therefore there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.124 On re-
hearing en banc, Motz is in the majority and expounds on her dissent in the
decision that carries the day.125
Writing for the majority, Motz begins by stating that defendants have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information that is voluntarily handed
over to a third party, even if that information is revealed under the assump-
tion that it would be used for a limited purpose.126 The majority believes that
the defendant, and, by implication, the majority in the previous hearing, dis-
regarded precedent, “misunderst[ood] the nature of CSLI, improperly at-
tempt[ed] to redefine the third-party doctrine, and blur[red] the critical
distinction between content and non-content information.”127
However, the majority never discussed the subjective and objective ele-
ments of the Katz test to determine whether there was actually a reasonable
expectation of privacy.128 The Graham court simply assumes that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy because the information was “voluntarily”
conveyed to a third party.129 In the precedent cited, the fact that the informa-
tion was voluntarily conveyed to a third party was the beginning of the
court’s analysis, not the end.130 Although the court in Graham makes their
121. Id.
122. Graham, 796 F.3d at 353.
123. See id. at 358–59.
124. See id. at 378–80.
125. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
126. Id. at 425.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 421.
129. See id.; see also Fourth Amendment—Third-Party Doctrine—Fourth Circuit
Holds That Government Acquisition of Historical Cell-Site Location Informa-
tion is Not a Search, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1277 [hereinafter Fourth
Amendment—Third-Party Doctrine] (“But Graham shows that courts have
shifted from trying to estimate what society really would consider reasonable,
as they did in the cases establishing the third-party doctrine, to substituting a
doctrinally constructed determination of reasonableness through the third-party
doctrine.”).
130. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979); see also United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 435 (1976)
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decision based on precedent, it seems that prior decisions may have been
misapplied.131
Although citing Supreme Court precedent as the reason for the reversal
en banc, Motz states that “[t]he Supreme Court may in the future limit, or
even eliminate, the third-party doctrine. Congress may act to require a war-
rant for CSLI. But without change in controlling law, we cannot conclude
that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.”132 The
Supreme Court may have its chance. A case with a strikingly similar fact
pattern was heard by the Court in November 2017, and their decision should
be released around June of 2018.133
In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court must decide whether
the warrantless collection of CSLI over a 127-day period violates the Fourth
Amendment.134 The president of the National Constitution Center, a non-
profit devoted to educating the public about the Constitution, believes that
this could be the “most important electronic privacy case of the 21st cen-
tury.”135 Apple, Facebook, and Google, among other technology companies,
filed a brief that urged the Court to modernize the Fourth Amendment.136 The
brief said that “[n]o constitutional doctrine should presume [. . .] that con-
sumers assume the risk of warrantless government surveillance simply by
using technologies that are beneficial and increasingly integrated into modern
life.”137 It is impossible to determine how the Court is going to decide, but
the outcome could transform Fourth Amendment law. The government ar-
gues that the third-party doctrine applies.138 Carpenter argues that he has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI.139 In oral arguments, Justice
Gorsuch wanted to focus on a property-based approach to analyzing the war-
131. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 425.
132. Id.
133. See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Takes on Major Fourth Amendment
Case, CNN (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/su-
preme-court-fourth-amendment-case/index.html.
134. See Adam Liptak, How a Radio Shack Robbery Could Spur a New Era in
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rantless acquisition of stored data.140 No matter the decision, the Fourth
Amendment and the third-party doctrine will be affected.
IV. VIRTUAL ASSISTANTS
We should briefly discuss what exactly a virtual assistant (i.e. Amazon
Echo) is and how it may present problems in third-party doctrine cases
before considering a solution to the application of the Fourth Amendment to
emerging technologies. Virtual assistants can be found in many devices and
are offered by several tech companies.141 These voice-activated assistants can
perform a variety of tasks: playing music, turning your lights on, adjusting
the thermostat, or locking your doors.142 Virtual assistants are being inte-
grated into a number of third-party devices, including vehicles.143 It is safe to
say that tech companies are striving to make these platforms indispensable
and omnipresent.144 Thirty-nine million Americans own a smart speaker that
features a virtual assistant.145 As of January 2017, nearly 77% of Americans
owned a smartphone, and many of those devices featured virtual assistants.146
So why are these devices so important in the Fourth Amendment con-
text? Virtual assistants, such as the Amazon Echo and Google Home, record
voice commands and send them to the manufacturer’s data center.147 Devices
such as these only record when they hear their “wake words,” like “hey
Alexa” or “hey Google.”148 Once the device hears the “wake word,” it begins
recording, it transmits the data to the manufacturer, the data is processed, and
then a response is transmitted back to the device.149 What users might not
140. See id.
141. See Jon Martindale, Cortana vs. Siri vs. Google Assistant, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/cortana-vs-siri-vs-
google-now/.
142. See Kim Wetzel, What is Alexa? It’s Amazon’s Virtual Voice Assistant, DIGI-
TAL TRENDS (May 11, 2018, 11:09 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/
what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-it-do/.
143. See Daisuke Wakabayashi & Nick Wingfield, Alexa, We’re Still Trying to Fig-
ure Out What to Do With You, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/01/15/technology/virtual-assistants-alexa.html.
144. See id.
145. See Browne, supra note 4.
146. See Aaron Smith, Record Shares of Americans Now Own Smartphones, Have
Home Broadband, PEW RES. INST. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2017/01/12/evolution-of-technology/.
147. See Deanna Paul, How Smart Devices Could Violate Your Privacy, ROLLING
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know about this process is that the manufacturer actually records and stores
all of the audio just before and following the “wake word,” or even words
that sounds similar to the wake word.150 For instance, if a virtual assistant
user is having a conversation with a confidant in a room near an Alexa de-
vice and says something along the lines of “I killed Alex. How do we get rid
of the body?” Amazon has that audio stored on their servers, and the govern-
ment may have access to that information without a warrant. The user wasn’t
voluntarily conveying that information to the device, but the device recorded
the information anyway. How would the Court analyze a Fourth Amendment
claim in this, or a similar, situation?
The previous scenario may seem far-fetched, but cases like these have
already been considered in the United States.151 In November 2015, the au-
thorities in Bentonville, Arkansas found a body floating in a hot tub.152 The
homeowner told the police that he was in bed and that the victim stayed up
drinking.153 The suspect (the homeowner) had an Alexa powered device in
his home, and the authorities subpoenaed Amazon to recover the recordings
that were stored from the suspect’s virtual assistant.154 Fortunately for the
suspect, Amazon refused to turn over the information citing First Amend-
ment protections, but you can imagine a scenario in which Amazon turned
over the data, and then a Fourth Amendment claim is born.155 The virtual
assistant is just one of the many emerging technologies that will require the
Fourth Amendment to evolve in order to provide adequate privacy protec-
tions. As much as we rely on these technologies, it would not be unreasona-
ble for the Court to find that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the data shared with third parties through these devices and that society is
prepared to recognize this expectation as reasonable.
V. HOW DO WE FIX IT? THE APPLICATION OF
THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
The court in Riley v. California spoke on the issues surrounding the
application of the Fourth Amendment to current technologies: “In light of
these developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the
21st century was left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instru-
150. See id.; see also Brian Heater, Can Your Smart Home Be Used Against You in
Court?, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 12, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/12/
alexa-privacy/.
151. See Gerald Sauer, A Murder Case Tests Alexa’s Devotion to Your Privacy,
WIRED.COM (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/murder-case-
tests-alexas-devotion-privacy/; see also Heater, supra note 150.
152. See Heater, supra note 150.
153. See Heater, supra note 150.
154. See Sauer, supra note 151; see also Heater, supra note 150.
155. See Sauer, supra note 151; see also Heater, supra note 150.
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ment of the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a
better position to assess and respond to the changes that have already oc-
curred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”156 Absent
sweeping legislation, which would be nearly impossible to pass in this politi-
cal climate, the Court must find a way to balance the expectation of privacy
against enforcement of the law in a way that does not discourage innovation
or the adoption of new technologies.
The Court can solve this problem by getting back to weighing the facts
specific to the case against the test formulated in the Katz concurrence rather
than simply deciding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy when
information is voluntarily conveyed to a third party.157 This will  require not
only that the two-prong test be applied, but also that the Court examine the
definition of “voluntary” and reevaluate what constitutes the “sensitivity of
information” conveyed when determining whether there is a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy.
It seems that courts have moved away from applying the two-part test
and towards a simple determination of whether the party could expect pri-
vacy; however, in order for any of the new interpretations to matter, the
Court must apply the facts to the two-part Katz test. Most recently in Gra-
ham, the court simply assumes there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
because the information was “voluntarily” conveyed to a third party.158 The
Court must get back to applying the two-part Katz test in third-party doctrine
cases and must further evolve its interpretations of the factors involved along
with the evolution of our dependence on technology.
Again, the Katz formula requires that the Court examine whether the
individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy.”159 The majority believed that this is met when “the individual
has shown that he seeks to preserve [something] as private.”160 Then, the
Court must determine whether the individual’s subjective expectation of pri-
vacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”161 The Katz
majority believed this meant whether the individual’s expectation, viewed
objectively, is “justifiable” under the circumstances.162 When applied to the
facts in Smith, the Court rejected the idea that the petitioner had a legitimate
156. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014).
157. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979).
158. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see
also Fourth Amendment—Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 129, at 1277.
159. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
160. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
162. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
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expectation of privacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone.163 The
Court seemed to imply that the test only applies when the information ob-
tained does not consist of “content” information.164 The Court then rejected
petitioner’s claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the num-
bers he dialed because they “doubt that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.”165 The majority also fo-
cused on the fact that the numbers are “conveyed” to the telephone company
and the company has the ability to maintain records, as phone companies
generally do, for “a variety of legitimate business purposes.”166 The Court
also rejected the petitioner’s argument that his conduct, using the phone in
his own home to the exclusion of all others, demonstrated a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.167 “Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calcu-
lated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not
and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he
dialed.”168
The Court doubled down and opined that even if petitioner had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, that expectation was not “one that society
was ready to recognize as reasonable.”169 The majority believed this to be so
because the petitioner “voluntarily” conveyed the information to a third
party.170 The Court cited Miller when determining that, because the informa-
tion was voluntarily conveyed to a third party, the petitioner assumed the risk
that the information would be divulged to the police.171
A. Follow Smith and Miller: Get Back to the Katz Test
The latest trend in third-party doctrine cases is simply the recitation of
precedent, deciding that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in in-
formation because it was voluntarily conveyed to a third party rather than
applying the Katz test.172 When determining whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Court in Miller and Smith, the oft cited precedent,
163. See id. at 741.
164. See id. at 742 (“Given a pen register’s limited capabilities, therefore, peti-
tioner’s argument that its installation and use constituted a ‘search’ necessarily
rests upon a claim that he had a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ regarding
the numbers he dialed on his phone.”).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 743.
167. Id.
168. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
169. Id. at 743–44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
170. See id.
171. Id. at 744.
172. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016).
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applied a two-part test, and the fact that information was voluntarily con-
veyed to a third party was simply one of many factors considered in finding
no reasonable expectation of privacy.173 In order to ensure that privacy inter-
ests are being protected, the Court must get back to applying the Katz test
and consider the totality of the circumstances before deciding there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. Conduct of the Individual: Presumption of Privacy Inside a Home
When applying the Katz test to cases that implicate the third-party doc-
trine, there are many factors that have been used in the Court’s analysis.174
The Katz majority believed that the subjective element would be met if the
individual showed “he seeks to preserve [something] as private.”175 The
Court should not only consider the actions of an individual, such as closing
the door of a phone booth behind them,176 but should also consider where
these actions take place. “Doctrinally, homes receive greater protection than
many contexts of search and seizure; only a few contexts, such as telephone
booths and bodily invasion, receive greater protection.”177 The Fourth
Amendment itself:
[E]mbodies a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy
of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection
against the long reach of the government is no less than to value
human dignity, and that this privacy must not be disturbed except
in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.178
A number of Supreme Court cases have recognized the sanctity of the
home and the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.179 The dissent
173. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–47 (1976); see also Smith, 442
U.S. at 740–46.
174. Id.
175. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
176. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
177. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912 (2010).
178. Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 642 n.2 (Pa. 2017) (citing JA-
COB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 47
(1966)).
179. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“[P]rivate residences are
places in which the individual normally expects privacy . . . and that expecta-
tion is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”); see also
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (holding that warrantless searches
and seizures inside a home are “presumptively unreasonable”).
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in Smith seems to agree that the home is sacred.180 “The information captured
by such surveillance emanates from private conduct within a person’s home
or office-locations that without question are entitled to Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment protection.”181 When analyzing whether there is a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy, the location of the action should be considered. There
should be a presumption of a reasonable expectation of privacy in actions
taken at home. For example, the Court in Smith should have considered that
the petitioner made the phone calls from the comfort of his own home with-
out broadcasting the numbers to the outside world as the dissent seems to
do.182 This should not be a deciding factor, but it most certainly should hold
some weight that must be overcome by other circumstances for the Court to
decline to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy.
C. What is “Voluntary?”
Another significant factor in the Court’s determination of whether there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable is the voluntary nature of the conveyance of the information.183
The Supreme Court makes this clear by stating:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the infor-
mation is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.184
In Miller, the Court found that the petitioner had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in bank records that were “voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business” and then
provided to the government.185 In Smith, the court found no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy “when petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical infor-
mation to the phone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its
180. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 747 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 743–44 (majority opinion) (“This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”); see also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421,
425 (4th Cir. 2016) (“For the Court has long held that an individual enjoys no
Fourth Amendment protection ‘in information he voluntarily turns over to a
third party.’”).
184. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
185. Id. at 442.
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equipment in the normal course of business.”186 Both of the dissents in these
cases, as well as many other third-party doctrine cases, questioned the “vol-
untary” nature of these conveyances.187 It is time for the Court to recognize
that much of what we convey to third parties today is not truly “voluntary” in
nature.
More recently, in United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor discussed
the prevalence with which we share information with others today.188 She
believes that the Court’s approach in denying to find a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.”189 The Court must follow suit and reevaluate what they
consider to be “voluntary.” Under the current interpretation of the third-party
doctrine, to avoid the reach of the government, an individual would have to
refrain from storing their money in banks and make all payments using cash.
All communications would have to be made in person or via carrier pigeon.
These actions are unrealistic in a world full of technology that could not
even have been imagined when the Katz or Miller opinions were being writ-
ten. The definition of “voluntary” must evolve with technology and its adop-
tion by America’s citizens. An individual’s transactional records with a bank
are not “voluntarily” conveyed. “It is impossible to participate in the eco-
nomic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”190
An individual’s cell-site location data is not truly “voluntarily” conveyed.
“There is no reason to think that a cell phone user is aware of his CSLI, or
that he is conveying it. He does not write it down on a piece of paper . . . or
enter it into a device.”191 Cellular providers can simply track the area in
which a cellular device is located at a given time because its customer carries
the phone with them at all times.192 With the need to be connected at all
times, nine-in-ten cellphone owners say they “frequently” carry their phones
186. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
187. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“For all practical pur-
poses, the disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs
to a bank is not entirely volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the
economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a bank account.”);
see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
189. Id.
190. Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
191. United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wynn, J.,
dissenting).
192. See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016).
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with them.193 Is ownership of a cellular phone truly “voluntary” in nature? It
could be argued that an individual must own a cell phone to function in to-
day’s society.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “voluntary” as “done by design or in-
tention; unconstrained by interference; not impelled by outside influence;
having merely nominal consideration.”194 Cell phone ownership and bank ac-
counts, for instance, are intentional acquisitions, but are they impelled by
outside influence? Does society require that one own a cellular phone or have
a bank account? Many would argue that these are necessary to be a contribut-
ing member of society. The Court must take a closer look at what “volun-
tary” truly means when analyzing a third-party doctrine case.
D. Sensitivity of Information
Finally, the Court analyzes the sensitivity of the information conveyed
when coming to the conclusion that an individual has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the information conveyed to third parties.195 The Court in
Miller examined “the nature of the particular documents sought to be pro-
tected in order to determine whether there [was] a legitimate ‘expectation of
privacy’” concerning the contents of petitioner’s bank records.196 If the sub-
poena sought the contents of the customer’s safe deposit box, would the out-
come have been different? What makes bank records less sensitive than cash
and jewelry in a safe deposit box? It can be argued, for instance, that bank
records tell authorities much more about an individual than security footage
from the bank. The Court in Smith determined that the numbers dialed from a
phone are not sensitive enough to warrant a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.197 In the dissent, Justice Stewart opined that “the numbers dialed from
a private telephone—although certainly more prosaic than the conversation
itself—are not without content . . . because it easily could reveal the identi-
ties of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate
details of a person’s life.”198
The Court should dig deeper into the sensitivity of the information con-
veyed rather than simply deciding that they “doubt that people in general
entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial,” for
193. See Lee Rainie & Kathryn Zickuhr, Americans’ Views on Mobile Etiquette,
PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/26/chap-
ter-1-always-on-connectivity/.
194. Voluntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
195. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43; see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,
335–36 (1973).
196. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
197. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
198. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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instance.199 The Court’s reasoning for making decisions such as this is be-
cause users “realize that they must ‘convey’” information to various compa-
nies so these companies may complete their transactions.200 Telephone users
must convey phone numbers to the telephone company since it is through the
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed: does
that sound voluntary?201 Individuals are not implying that the information
that they must share is not sensitive simply by conveying this information to
a third party. The Court must move back to a context-based approach when
determining whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in informa-
tion shared with a third party.
VI. POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED SOLUTION
The proposed solution is not without problems. In the most recent deci-
sions, such as Graham, courts have failed to even apply the Katz test. The
Court would have to overrule prior decisions by deciding that voluntarily
conveying information to a third party is not a determinative factor in third-
party doctrine cases. However, the Supreme Court would be moving back to
the application of Smith and Miller, older precedent, and applying these cases
and their reasoning moving forward rather than applying their new decisions
retroactively.
An additional problem with the proposed solutions discussed may cause
the Court to draw arbitrary lines in determining what is voluntary, what is
sensitive, and what conduct is to be considered worthy of an expression of a
subjective expectation of privacy. However, it seems that Courts have al-
ready drawn arbitrary lines when determining what warrants a reasonable
expectation of privacy. For instance, the Court in Smith decided that the
phone numbers and individual dials are not “sensitive” in nature.202 Further-
more, the in-depth analysis proposed could be a burdensome task on the
Court. If the Court must apply each fact pattern and analyze it under the Katz
test rather than simply deciding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
because an individual shared information with a third party, the Court may
find itself accepting many more cases that implicate the third-party doctrine
before establishing a new line of precedent. In addition, new technologies
emerge every day, and, without a blanket decision, new issues will arise that
will produce litigation.
However, the interest in privacy outweighs judicial economy. Establish-
ing a line of precedent that balances an interest in privacy with an interest in
law enforcement that is relevant to the technological world in which we live
is worth the additional work that would be necessary to update third-party
doctrine application. If the Graham decision is an indication of what is to
199. Id. at 742 (majority opinion).
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
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come, then nearly all of our information the Court finds to be “non-sensitive”
will be available to the government without a warrant. We share nearly eve-
rything with a third party in society today, and we must protect this informa-
tion without placing an undue burden on law enforcement.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF VIRTUAL ASSISTANTS
Under current judicial interpretations, if the Court were to subpoena the
data from a smart device with a virtual assistant, the Court may find that the
user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in “non-content” information
but would protect the actual audio recorded. It is difficult, to be sure, because
this particular scenario has yet to play out in the courts. Consider a hypotheti-
cal case in which the defendant was suspected of a murder. In the defen-
dant’s home, he had an Amazon Echo device. The authorities subpoena
Amazon to obtain the information shared with them by the defendant. Under
the current interpretation of the third-party doctrine, the information would
be allowed to convict the defendant as long as it did not contain the actual
audio. Some examples of information that may be allowed include purchase
information, scheduled appointments, location information, and web
searches, all without a warrant. Under the proposed solutions, when analyz-
ing the defendant’s claim that an unlawful search occurred when the govern-
ment obtained this data without a warrant, the courts would begin by
applying the Katz test. First, did the petitioner exhibit an actual expectation
of privacy?203 Second, is that expectation one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable?204
The Court in Smith and Miller consider the sensitivity of the information
conveyed and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance when determin-
ing whether the individual has shown that he seeks to preserve something as
private.205 Under the proposed solution, the Court would start by presuming a
privacy interest in this information, because the petitioner’s interactions with
his virtual assistant via his Echo device took place in the home. It is clear that
the petitioner wished for these interactions to remain private because he
could have left his home and made the hypothetical purchases rather than
asking Alexa. He could have ventured to the library and researched “how to
dispose of a body” rather than asking Alexa. He believed that, in the safety of
his own home, his information would remain private. To overcome the pre-
sumption, the Court could then weigh the sensitivity of the information and
the defendant’s other actions against the presumption of privacy.
When analyzing the sensitivity of the information, the Court should not
simply decide that no reasonable person believes that his web searches and
purchase information are protected. The Court should dig in to what informa-
203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–47 (1976); see also Smith, 442
U.S. at 740–46.
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tion the government can glean from something that seems as “harmless” as
the numbers dialed on a phone.206 Purchase information not only contains
groceries and clothing but also a number of other things that individuals may
wish to keep private, such as medication or items that could be embarrassing
or harmful to one’s reputation. An individual’s search history produces the
same conclusions, as evidenced by “If I die, delete my browser history” t-
shirts that can be purchased today. In this case, the sensitivity of the informa-
tion conveyed would not give the Court an adequate reason to overcome the
presumption that the petitioner sought to keep the information conveyed
from his home private and, therefore, had a subjective reasonable expectation
of privacy.
The Court would then analyze whether the expectation is one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable.207 The Courts in Smith and Miller
seem to determine that society is not prepared to recognize an expectation as
reasonable when an individual voluntarily turns information over to third
parties.208 Under the proposed solution, the Court would analyze the volun-
tary nature of the conveyance. Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of volun-
tary includes “not impelled by outside influence.”209 The Court would have
to determine if societal norms are considered an “outside influence.” The
regularity with which we use technology to make our purchases and do our
research, among other things, and, as a result, share our information with a
third party, seems to indicate that these actions are not truly voluntary, but
more of a necessity.210
It is true that an individual chooses to make a purchase through a virtual
assistant “voluntarily” within the simplest meaning of the word, but to say
that an individual is “voluntarily” sharing that purchasing information with a
third party is a stretch. An alternative to making a purchase through a smart
device would be to go to the store and make the purchase at the physical
location. But at the store, you are “sharing” your purchase information with
the teller and even your bank when you use a debit or credit card. Sharing
purchase information with a third party is absolutely necessary in order to
participate in a transaction, and, thus, is not truly voluntary. The analysis is
the same for search histories. By digging deeper into the analysis of whether
information is “voluntarily” conveyed, the Court should determine that this
information is not, in fact, voluntarily shared, and thus should come to the
206. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“I doubt there are any who
would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the . . . numbers they
have called . . . because it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and
the places he called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s
life.”).
207. See id. at 743–44 (majority opinion).
208. See id.; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
209. Voluntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
210. See Browne, supra note 4.
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determination that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
information.
Although under this hypothetical, the government would not be able to
use this information against the defendant because it was obtained without a
warrant, the government could avoid this scenario altogether if they receive a
warrant prior to the collection of the information. This solution does not hin-
der law enforcement to the extent that they will not be able to convict
criminals. It simply ensures that law enforcement obtains information in a
way that allows for consideration of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment pri-
vacy interests beforehand. The warrant requirement in the Fourth Amend-
ment was included for this very reason.211
VIII. CONCLUSION
The current interpretation of the third-party doctrine is in danger of
completely nullifying Fourth Amendment protections in a world that all but
requires us to share our information with third parties. The trend of disre-
garding the test set forth in Katz and replacing it with the determination that
whatever information is “voluntarily” conveyed to a third party is afforded
no Fourth Amendment protection is a misapplication of precedent. The Court
must get back to applying the Katz test in third-party doctrine analysis.
However, the application of the Katz test consistent with Smith and
Miller is a merely a half-baked solution. The Court should go one step fur-
ther in analyzing the factors and propose a presumption of privacy in actions
taken in the home. In addition, the Court’s definition of “voluntary” should
be reexamined, and the decision that information lacks sensitivity should re-
quire further analysis. Without change, the government has warrantless ac-
cess to a wealth of information that most citizens would consider private. In
the words of Justice Sotomayor, the current approach “is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about them-
selves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”212 The
Court should heed her words and make a change before the Fourth Amend-
ment vanishes in the wake of technological advancements.
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
212. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
